Jama, caleta y camello: la corrupción como mecanismo de autorrefuerzo del clientelismo político

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Ramón Máiz

Abstract

This article seeks to explain the joint empirical presence of corruption and political clientelism in Latin America and to explore their structural relations. It therefore proceeds to describe the individual rationalism behind the clientelist mechanism and its attraction for voters without resources. It then examines the difficulties of dealing with the demand for goods and services for clients in neoliberal contexts and the growing competition with party programs and its final result; the progressive overlapping of patronclient networks with those of political corruption.

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How to Cite
Máiz, R. (2003). Jama, caleta y camello: la corrupción como mecanismo de autorrefuerzo del clientelismo político. Revista Mexicana De Sociologí­a, 65(1), 3–39. https://doi.org/10.22201/iis.01882503p.2003.001.5941
Section
ARTÍCULOS

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