Maten al león. El castigo a los dictadores salientes

Abstract

THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DICTATORS ARE PUNISHED AFTER LOSING POWER. A NEW VARIABLE THAT CODIFIES THE FATE OF DICTATORS DEFEATED BETWEEN 1946 AND 2000 IS USED TO DEMONSTRATE THE INABILITY OF SUBSEQUENT DEMOCRATIC REGIMES TO BRING FORMER TYRANTS TO JUSTICE FOR STRATEGIC REASONS. IT ALSO PROVIDES EVIDENCE THAT PUNISHMENT IS MORE LIKELY FOR PERSONALISTIC DICTATORS, AND MUCH LESS FOR MILITARY OR ONE PARTY REGIMES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT HAS COUNTER-INTUITIVE EFFECTS: A HIGHER NUMBER OF DICTATORSHIPS IN THE REGION MAKE PUNISHMENT MORE LIKELY, WHEREAS A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT.