Una defensa de la concepción minimalista de la democracia

Adam Przeworski

Resumen


Este artículo es una defensa de la concepción schumpeteriana "minimalista" de la democracia, como un sistema en el cual los gobernantes son elegidos a través de elecciones competitivas. Contrariamente a lo esperado, no existen razones de peso para pensar que si los gobernantes son electos de esta manera las decisiones políticas serán racionales, los gobiernos representativos, o la distribución de los ingresos igualitaria. Sin embargo, el hecho mismo de que la democracia permite la alternancia del poder puede hacer que las fuerzas políticas resuelvan sus conflictos de manera pacífica. Siguiendo a Popper, la democracia es el único sistema en el que los ciudadanos pueden deshacerse de sus gobiernos sin el derramamiento de sangre. No obstante, la postura popperiana no basta, pues la democracia sólo permanece bajo ciertas condiciones económicas e institucionales. Así, una concepción minimalista de la democracia no evita la necesidad de pensar en su diseño.

Palabras clave


concepción minimalista de la democracia; Joseph A. Schumpeter; Karl Popper.

Texto completo:

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Referencias


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iis.01882503p.1997.3.60697

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